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Slow moving demographics are aging populations around the world and pushing many countries into
an extended period of heightened fiscal stress. In some countries, taxes alone cannot or likely will
not fully fund projected pension and health care expenditures. If economic agents place sufficient probability
on the economy hitting its "fiscal limit" at some point in the future--after which further tax revenues
are not forthcoming--it may no longer be possible for monetary policy behavior that obeys the Taylor
principle to control inflation or anchor inflation expectations. In the period leading up to the fiscal
limit, the more aggressively that monetary policy leans against inflationary winds, the more expected
inflation becomes unhinged from the inflation target. Problems confronting monetary policy are exacerbated
when policy institutions leave fiscal objectives and targets unspecified and, therefore, fiscal expectations
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Policymakers have long understood that if ﬁscal policy runs amuck and monetary policy
is forced to raise seigniorage revenues, big inﬂations result. Latin American policymakers
understand this outcome better than most. This message is implicit in Cagan’s (1956)
initial study of hyperinﬂation and the message is explicit in Sargent and Wallace’s (1981)
theoretical analysis of how monetary policy can lose control of inﬂation and Sargent’s (1983)
interpretation of historical episodes of high inﬂations. The message is forcefully promulgated
by international economic organizations that prescribe policy reforms to troubled economies.
Underlying this view is the notion that if central bankers display suﬃcient resolve and stick
to their inﬂation-ﬁghting guns, ﬁscal policy will eventually relent and reform. Unfortunately,
wishing it were so does not make it so.
Recent research on monetary and ﬁscal policieshas learned that the ways in which policies
interact to determine inﬂation and inﬂuence the real economy are far more subtle than the
“monetization of debt” perspective implies. For example, Sargent and Wallace’s (1975) early
ﬁnding that if the central bank pegs the nominal interest rate—or more generally does not
adjust the rate strongly with inﬂation—then the equilibrium inﬂation rate is undetermined,
is not robust to alternative assumptions about ﬁscal behavior: Leeper (1991) and others
have shown that if primary surpluses are unresponsive to the state of government debt, then
inﬂation is uniquely determined. This is not merely of academic interest. Central banks
do go through periods when they adjust interest rates weakly to inﬂation and many banks
are now, in eﬀect, pegging the nominal rate near the zero lower bound. If such behavior
endangered price stability by not pinning down the inﬂation process, this would be of great
practical concern.
Another example that has received much attention is that when a government issues
nominal debt denominated in its home currency, it is possible for ﬂuctuations in current or
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expected primary surpluses to generate important aggregate demand eﬀects.1 Policies that
set the nominal interest rate independently of inﬂation and primary surpluses independently
of outstanding debt represent the canonical case in which a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut today,
which does not carry with it an expectation of higher taxes in the future, raises household
wealth and increases aggregate demand. In the standard models used for policy analysis,
higher demand raises both output and inﬂation; higher inﬂation serves to revalue outstanding
nominal debt. Debt revaluation can be an important source of ﬁscal ﬁnancing by ensuring
that this mix of policies is sustainable.
This canonical case also points to circumstances in which monetary policy can no longer
control inﬂation. Some observers dismiss the case as special, preferring to stick to the
convention that ﬁscal policy is Ricardian in the sense that expansions in debt are always
backed by higher expected primary surpluses [McCallum (2001)]. Unfortunately, as I shall
argue, demographic, political, and economics realities in many countries may not conform
to this conventional view.
Within the class of new Keynesian models now in wide use for monetary policy analysis,
something of a consensus has developed around what constitutes “good” monetary policy
behavior. In terms of implementable simple rules—as opposed to, say, Ramsey optimal
solutions—a necessary condition is that the central bank adjust the nominal interest rate
more than one-for-one with inﬂation; this is called the “Taylor principle” [Taylor (1993)].
This principle seems to produce nearly optimal outcomes in models now in use at central
banks [see, for example, Henderson and McKibbin (1993), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,
1999), Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007), and papers in Taylor (1999b)].
In this paper I explore how the Taylor principle characterization of “good” monetary
policy fares in periods of heightened ﬁscal stress. Fiscal stress is what Chile, the United
States, much of Europe, Japan, and a great many other countries are facing in the coming
decades as their populations age and government transfer payments for pensions and health
care are anticipated to rise substantially as a share of GDP.
It is unlikely that tax revenues alone can ﬁnance these promised transfers. Some coun-
tries are already at or near the peaks of their Laﬀer curves, according to some estimates
[Trabandt and Uhlig (2009)]. In those countries, it may be economically impossible to raise
suﬃcient revenues. Other countries—with the United States as the leading example—seem
to have little tolerance for high tax rates and may ﬁnd it politically impossible to raise taxes
enough. In either scenario, these countries could easily reach their ﬁscal limits well before the
“generational storm”—in Kotlikoﬀ and Burns’s (2004) memorable phrase—has fully played
out. At its ﬁscal limit, a government can no longer follow the conventional prescription by
which ﬁscal policy takes care of itself—and everything else that aﬀects the value of govern-
ment debt—by ﬁnancing government debt entirely through future surpluses. By extension,
the ﬁscal limit makes it infeasible for monetary policy to always obey the Taylor principle,
for doing so results in unsustainable policies.
At the ﬁscal limit, macro policies enter a new realm that economists have only begun
to study systematically. Once taxes can no longer adjust and government purchases have
achieved their socially acceptable lower bound, only two sources of ﬁscal ﬁnancing remain:
1The list of contributors to this literature is long, but some key papers include Leeper (1991, 1993),
Woodford (1994, 1995), Sims (1994, 2005), Cochrane (1999, 2001), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Schmitt-
Groh´ e and Uribe (2000), Daniel (2001), and Corsetti and Ma´ ckowiak (2006).
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incomplete honoring of promised transfers and surprise revaluations of outstanding nominal
government bonds or some combination of both.2 The ﬁrst option would permit monetary
policy to continue to follow a Taylor principle because, in eﬀect, actual transfers are adjust-
ing to ﬁnance government debt. But the same demographics that are behind the growing
transfers payments also create powerful political pressures for democratic governments to
honor their earlier promises. The second option allows the government to fully honor its
ﬁnancial commitments, but requires the central bank to give up control of inﬂation. A more
likely outcome is some mix of the two options, possibly with policy ﬂuctuating between
the two distinct monetary-ﬁscal regimes. With the mixed outcome, monetary policy would
still lose control of inﬂation, as Davig and Leeper (2006b, 2009), Chung, Davig, and Leeper
(2007), and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009) show.
No government has made it completely clear to its populace how the coming ﬁscal storm
will be weathered. Existing rules governing ﬁscal behavior, where they exist, are not obvi-
ously robust to an environment in which government transfers constitute a growing fraction
of GDP. And how such ﬁscal rules interact with, say, an inﬂation-targeting monetary policy
is not well understood. Some large countries, like Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, seem to have made no provisions whatsoever for dealing with future ﬁscal
stresses. In those countries, the public has no choice but to speculate about how future
policies will adjust. How can expectations of inﬂation and interest rates be anchored by
monetary policy in this new policy realm? What will determine such expectations if not
monetary policy? How does the public’s speculation about future policy adjustments aﬀect
the equilibrium today?
1.1 Anchoring Expectations There is much ballyhoo about how a major beneﬁt of
having central banks adopt an explicitinﬂation target is that it contributes in important ways
to anchoring private expectations of inﬂation. There are as many deﬁnitions of “anchoring
expectations” as there are people repeating the mantra. Faust and Henderson (2004) grapple
with the deﬁnition in their thoughtful piece about best-practice monetary policy. Many
of their concerns spring from the fact that central banks—even inﬂation targeters—have
multiple objectives and face tradeoﬀs among those objectives. For our purposes, we simplify
the problem by positing that the central bank targets only inﬂation at π∗ and the tax
authority targets only government debt at b∗. Faust and Henderson correctly observe that
if the primary objective of inﬂation targeting is to anchor long-run expectations of inﬂation,
then formally this amounts to ensuring that limj→∞ Etπt+j = π∗. But by this deﬁnition
of anchoring, as Faust and Henderson point out, best-practice monetary policy permits
|Etπt+j − π∗| > ε > 0 for all j ≥ 0: at times, expected inﬂation over any forecast horizon
will be very far from target.
No inﬂation-targeting central bank embraces such a liberal deﬁnition of anchoring expec-
tations. The Central Bank of Chile aims “to keep annual CPI inﬂation around 3% most of
the time” [Banco Central de Chile (2007)]. Sveriges Riksbank targets 2 percent in Sweden
2I take oﬀ the table two other options: sovereign debt default and pure inﬂation taxes. It is diﬃcult
to imagine an equilibrium in which many large countries default simultaneously, though this possibility
deserves further research. Pure inﬂation taxes are removed on the grounds that historical experience with
hyperinﬂations has found them to be an extraordinarily costly means of ﬁscal ﬁnancing. Moreover, like
income taxes, inﬂation taxes are also subject to a Laﬀer curve and, therefore, a ﬁscal limit.
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[Sveriges Riksbank (2008)]. Both Chile and Sweden have a tolerance range of plus or minus
1 percentage point. In New Zealand, the Reserve Bank targets CPI inﬂation between 1 and
3 percent [Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2008)]. It is not apparent from their web pages,
but I imagine that all inﬂation-targeting central banks would interpret “long run” to be
something shy of inﬁnity. I also imagine that if in those economies expected inﬂation could
drift arbitrarily far from target for arbitrarily long periods, the central banks would not
feel that they have successfully anchored long-run inﬂation expectations (even if one could
prove that the Faust-Henderson limiting condition for expected inﬂation held). Analogous
ranges tend to be applied in ministries of ﬁnance and treasuries that have an explicit target
for government debt [see, for example, New Zealand Treasury (2009), Swedish Ministry of
Finance (2008)].
In this paper I shall adopt the more pragmatic notion of anchored expectations that policy
authorities seem to apply. If in an equilibrium, expectations of a policy target variable can
deviate widely from target for an extended period, then expectations are not well anchored
on the announced targets.
1.2 What the Theory Says I lay out three very simple theoretical models to make
concrete the issues that arise in an environment where taxes have reached their limit, but
government transfers grow relentlessly. The theory suggests that even if economic agents
know how policies will adjust once the economy hits the ﬁscal limit, it may no longer be
possible for monetary policy to achieve its inﬂation target.3 Monetary policy’s loss of control
of inﬂation begins well before the ﬁscal limit is hit. Because agents know such a limit exists,
monetary policy cannot control inﬂation even in the period leading up to the limit when
monetary policy dutifully follows the Taylor principle and ﬁscal policy systematically raises
taxes to stabilize debt.
The central bank’s problems controlling inﬂation become more profound in the arguably
more plausible environment where agents are uncertain about how monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies will adjust in the future once the ﬁscal limit is reached. In such a setting it is easy to
see how expectations can become unanchored, particularly if monetary and ﬁscal authorities
do little to help resolve uncertainty about future policies.
Policy uncertainty almost certainly reduces welfare. Existing work tends to model the
uncertainty in rather stylized forms—a stochastic capital tax, for example—but nonetheless
ﬁnds that greater uncertainty reduces growth and welfare [Hopenhayn (1996) and Aizenman
and Marion (1993)]. Uncertainty can also generate an option value for waiting to invest-
ment, which slows growth [Bernanke (1983), Dixit (1989), and Pindyck (1988)]. Indeed, one
argument for having central banks announce their intended interest rate paths is to reduce
uncertainty about monetary policy and better anchor expectations and improve the eﬀec-
tiveness of monetary policy [Faust and Leeper (2005), Rudebusch and Williams (2006), and
Svensson (2006)]. While the implications of uncertainty for welfare are important, I do not
pursue them in the positive analysis that follows.
3Sims (2005) makes closely related points in the context of inﬂation targeting. Sims (2009) explains
that as an application of Wallace’s (1981) Modigliani-Miller theorem for open-market operations, many of
the extraordinary measures that central banks have taken over the past year or so run the risk of being
insuﬃciently backed by ﬁscal policy and, therefore, may make it diﬃcult for monetary policy alone to anchor
inﬂation.
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In light of the profound policy uncertainty that many countries will soon face, I ﬁnd
myself in sympathy with North (1990, p. 83): “The major role of institutions in a society
is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily eﬃcient) structure
to human interaction. The overall stability of an institutional framework makes complex
exchange possible across both time and space.” Only the policy institutions themselves—
via the desires of the electorate—can help to resolve the uncertainty and only by reducing
uncertainty can policy institutions hope to anchor expectations reliably.
After deriving theoretical results, the paper turns to contrast the monetary-ﬁscal policy
frameworks in Chile and the United States. Whereas Chile has adopted speciﬁc objectives
and even rules for the conduct of monetary and ﬁscal policy, America has consistently es-
chewed rules-based policies. Chile’s policies contribute toward keeping the economy well
away from the ﬁscal limit, permitting Banco Central de Chile to target inﬂation and anchor
expectations of inﬂation. In contrast, in the United States, agents have good reason to be
concerned that taxes may reach the ﬁscal limit, undermining the Federal Reserve’s ability
to control inﬂation now and in the future.
2 Three Simple Models
I present three models of price-level and inﬂation determination that increase in the subtlety
of the interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policies. Throughout the analysis I restrict
attention to rational expectations equilibria, so the results I present can be readily contrasted
to prevailing views, which also are based on rational expectations.
The ﬁrst model draws from Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), and Woodford (2001) to lay the
groundwork for how monetary and ﬁscal policies jointly determine equilibrium. These results
are well known, but the broader implications of thinking about macro policies jointly are not
fully appreciated. A second model adds one layer of subtlety by positing that at some known
date in the future, call it T, the economy will reach its ﬁscal limit, at which point it is not
possible to raise further revenues. At that limit, policy regime—the mix of monetary and
ﬁscal rules—changes in some known way. This model illustrates how expectations of future
policies can feed back to aﬀect the current equilibrium. The ﬁnal model adds one more layer
of subtlety: although agents know regime will change at date T, they are uncertain what
mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies will be realized. In the third model, agents’ expectations
of inﬂation depend on the subjective probabilities they attach to possible future policies.
The last two models draw on work in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009).
The models illustrate how interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policies, the possi-
bility of regime changes, and uncertainty about future regimes create diﬃculties for policy
authorities who aim to anchor private expectations on the targets of policy.
Each model has a common speciﬁcation of the behavior of the private sector. An inﬁnitely
lived representative household is endowed each period with a constant quantity of non-
storable goods, y. To keep the focus away from seigniorage considerations, we examine a
cashless economy, which can be obtained by making the role of ﬁat currency inﬁnitesimally
small. Government issues nominal one-period bonds, allowing us to deﬁne the price level,
P, as the rate at which bonds exchange for goods.
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taking prices and R−1B−1 > 0 as given. The household pays taxes, τt, and receives transfers,
zt, each period, both of which are lump sum.
Government spending is zero each period, so the government chooses sequences of taxes,
transfers, and debt to satisfy its ﬂow constraint
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given R−1B−1 > 0, while the monetary authority chooses a sequence for the nominal interest
rate.
After imposing goods market clearing, ct = y for t ≥ 0, the household’s consumption









The exogenous (ﬁxed) gross real interest rate, 1/β, makes the analysis easier but is not
without some lose of generality, as Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009) show in the context
of ﬁscal ﬁnancing in a model with nominal rigidities. This is less the case in a small open
economy, so one interpretation of this model is that it is a small open economy in which
government debt is denominated in terms of the home nominal bonds (“currency”) and all
debt is held by domestic agents.
2.1 Model 1 I begin with simple ﬁxed policy regimes in order to solidify the understand-
ing of how monetary and ﬁscal policies jointly determine the equilibrium price level and
inﬂation rate. The focus on price-level determination is entirely for analytical convenience;
it is not a statement that inﬂation is the only thing macro policy authority do or should care
about. Because price-level determination is the ﬁrst step toward understanding how macro
policies aﬀect the aggregate economies, the key insights I derive from this model extend to
more complex environments.
2.1.1 Active Monetary/Passive Tax Policy This model reiterates well-known re-
sults about how inﬂation is determined in the canonical model of monetary policy, as pre-
sented in textbooks by Gal´ ı (2008) and Woodford (2003), for example. This regime—denoted
active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy—combines an interest rate rule in which the central
bank aggressively adjusts the nominal rate in response to current inﬂation with a tax rule in
which the tax authority adjusts taxes in response to government debt suﬃciently to stabilize
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debt.4 In this textbook, best-of-all-possible worlds, monetary policy can consistently hit its
inﬂation target and ﬁscal policy can achieve its target for the real value of debt.
To derive the equilibrium price level for the model laid out above, we need to specify rules
for monetary, tax, and transfers policies. Monetary policy follows a conventional interest rate
rule, which for analytical convenience, is written somewhat unconventionally in terms of the












, α > 1/β (5)
where π∗ is the inﬂation target and R = π∗/β is the steady state nominal interest rate. The
condition on the policy parameter α ensures that monetary policy is suﬃciently hawkish in
response to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation that it can stabilize inﬂation around π∗.









, γ > r = 1/β − 1 (6)
where b∗ is the debt target, τ∗ is the steady state level of taxes, and r = 1/β − 1 is the net
real interest rate. Imposing that γ exceeds the net real interest rate guarantees that any
increase in government debt creates an expectation that future taxes will rise by enough to
both service the higher debt and retire it back to b∗.
For now we shall assume that government transfers evolve exogenously according to the
stochastic process
zt = (1 − ρ)z
∗ + ρzt−1 + εt, 0 < ρ < 1 (7)
where z∗ is steady-state transfers and εt is a serially uncorrelated shock with Etεt+1 = 0.

















Aggressive reactions of monetary policy to inﬂation imply that β/α < 1 and the unique
bounded solution for inﬂation is
πt = π
∗ (9)
so equilibrium inﬂation is always on target, as is expected inﬂation.5
4Applying Leeper’s (1991) deﬁnitions, “active” monetary policy targets inﬂation, while “passive” mon-
etary policy weakly adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to inﬂation; “active” tax policy sets the
tax rate independently of government debt and “passive” tax policy changes rates strongly enough when
debt rises to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio; “active” transfers policy makes realized transfers equal promised
transfers, while “passive” transfers policy allows realized transfers to be less than promised.
5As Cochrane (2007) emphasizes, echoing Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983), there are actually a continuum of
explosive solutions to (8), each one associated with the central bank threatening to drive inﬂation to positive
or negative inﬁnity if the private sector’s expectations are not anchored on π∗. Cochrane uses this logic
to argue that fundamentally only ﬁscal policy can uniquely determine inﬂation. Pure theory cannot guide
us to the unique solution in (9), but common sense can. Suppose that (5) is not a complete description of
policy behavior in all states of the world and that there is a component to policy that says if the economy
goes oﬀ on an explosive path, monetary policy will change its behavior appropriately to push the economy
back to π∗. If that extra component of policy is credible, agents will know that long-run expectations of
inﬂation other than π∗ are inconsistent with equilibrium and, therefore, cannot be rational expectations. In
this paper, I sidestep this dispute and simply accept the conventional assertion that we are interested in the
unique bounded solution in (9).
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If monetary policy determines inﬂation—and the path of the price level, {Pt}—how must
ﬁscal policy respond to disturbances in transfers to ensure that policy is sustainable? This is
where passive tax adjustments step in. Substituting the tax rule, (6), into the government’s
budget constraint, (3), taking expectations conditional on information at t−1, and employing


















Because β−1 − γ < 1, higher debt brings forth the expectation of higher taxes, so (10)
describes how debt is expected to return to steady state following a shock to zt. In a steady
state in which εt ≡ 0, debt is b∗ = (τ∗−z∗)/(β−1 −1), equal to the present value of primary
surpluses.
Another perspective on the ﬁscal ﬁnancing requirements when monetary policy is tar-
geting inﬂation emerges from a ubiquitous equilibrium condition. In any dynamic model
with rational agents, government debt derives its value from its anticipated backing. In this
model, that anticipated backing comes from tax revenues net of transfer payments, τt − zt.
The value of government debt can be obtained by imposing equilibrium on the government’s







j(τt+j − zt+j) (IEC)
This equilibrium condition provides a new perspective on the crux of passive tax policy.
Because Pt is nailed down by monetary policy and {zt+j}∞
j=1 is being set independently of
both monetary and tax policies, any increase in transfers at t, which is ﬁnanced by new sales
of Bt, must generate an expectation that taxes will rise in the future by exactly enough to
support the higher value of Bt/Pt.
In this model, the only potential source of an expansion in debt is disturbances to trans-
fers. But passive tax policy implies that this pattern of ﬁscal adjustment must occur re-
gardless of the reason that Bt increases: economic downturns that automatically reduce
taxes and raise transfers, changes in household portfolio behavior, changes in government
spending, or central bank open-market operations. To expand on the last example, we could
modify this model to include money to allow us to imagine that the central bank decides
to tighten monetary policy exogenously at t by conducting an open-market sale of bonds.
If monetary policy is active, then the monetary contraction both raises Bt—bonds held by
households—and it lowers Pt; real debt rises from both eﬀects. This can be an equilibrium
only if ﬁscal policy is expected to support it by passively raising future tax revenues. Refusal
by tax policy to adjust appropriately undermines the ability of open-market operations to
aﬀect inﬂation in the conventional manner.6
6This is an application of the general insight contained in Wallace (1981). Sargent and Wallace’s “Un-
pleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” (1981) outcome emerges because the tax authority refuses to respond “ap-
propriately,” forcing monetary policy in the future to abandon its inﬂation target. Tobin (1980) emphasizes
the distinct consequences for household’s portfolios of “normal”central bank operations, such as open-market
operations, and helicopter drops of money. Section 2.2 picks up this theme.
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A policy regime in which monetary policy is active and tax policy is passive produces
the conventional outcome that inﬂation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon
and a hawkish central bank can successfully anchor actual and expected inﬂation at the
inﬂation target. Tax policy must support the active monetary behavior by passively adjusting
taxes to ﬁnance disturbances to government debt—from whatever source, includingmonetary
policy—and ensure policy is sustainable.
Although conventional, this regime is not the only mechanism by which monetary and
ﬁscal policy can jointly deliver a unique bounded equilibrium. We turn now to the other
polar case.
2.1.2 Passive Monetary/Active Tax Policy Passive tax behavior is a stringent
requirement: the tax authority must be willing and able to raise taxes in the face of rising
government debt. For a variety of reasons, this does not always happen, and it certainly
does not happen in the automated way prescribed by the tax rule in (6). Sometimes political
factors—such as the desire to seek reelection—preventtaxes from rising as needed to stabilize
debt.7 Some countries simply do not have the ﬁscal infrastructure in place to generate the
necessary tax revenues. Others might be at or near the peak of their Laﬀer curves, suggesting
they are close to the ﬁscal limit.8 In this case, tax policy is active and 0 ≤ γ < 1/β − 1.
Analogously, there are also periods when the concerns of monetary policy move away from
inﬂation stabilization and toward other matters, such as output stabilization or ﬁnancial
crises. These are periods in which monetary policy is no longer active, instead adjusting the
nominal interest rate only weakly in response to inﬂation. The global recession and ﬁnancial
crisis of 2007-2009 is a striking case when central banks’ concerns shifted away from inﬂation.
Then monetary policy is passive and, in terms of the policy rule, (5), 0 ≤ α < 1/β.9
We focus on a particular policy mix that yields clean economic interpretations: the
nominal interest rate is set independently of inﬂation, α = 0 and R
−1
t = R−1, and taxes
are set independently of debt, γ = 0 and τt = τ∗. These policy speciﬁcations might seem
extreme and special, but the qualitative points that emerge generalize to other speciﬁcations
of passive monetary/active tax policies.
One result pops out immediately. Applying the pegged nominal interest rate policy to












so expected inﬂation is anchored on the inﬂation target, an outcome that is perfectly consis-
tent with one aim of inﬂation-targeting central banks. It turns out, however, that another
aim of inﬂation targeters—stabilization of actual inﬂation—which can be achieved by active
monetary/passive ﬁscal policy, is no longer attainable.
7Davig and Leeper (2006b, 2009) generalize (6) to estimate Markov switching rules for the United States
and ﬁnd that tax policy has switched between periods when tax rise with debt and periods when it does not.
8Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) characterize Laﬀer curves for capital and labor taxes in 14 EU countries and
the United States to ﬁnd that some countries—Denmark and Sweden—are on the wrong side of the curve,
suggesting that must lower tax rates to raise revenues.
9Davig and Leeper (2006b, 2009) provide evidence of this for the United States and Davig and Leeper
(2007) study the nature of equilibria when monetary policy regularly switches between being active and
being passive.
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At time t, the numerator of this expression is predetermined, representing the nominal value
of household wealth carried into period t. The denominator is the expected present value of
primary ﬁscal surpluses from date t on, which is exogenous. So long as Rt−1Bt−1 > 0 and
the present value of revenues exceeds the present value of transfers, a condition that must
hold if government debt has positive value, expression (13) delivers a unique Pt > 0.
We have done nothing mystical here, despite what some critics claim [for example, Buiter
(2002) or McCallum (2001)]. In particular, the government is not assumed to behave in a
manner that violates its budget constraint. Unlike competitive households, the government
is not required to choose sequences of control variables that are consist with its budget
constraint for all possible price sequences. Indeed, for a central bank to target inﬂation,
it cannot be choosing its policy instrument to be consistent with any sequence of the price
level; doing so would produce an indeterminate equilibrium. Identical reasoning applies to
the ﬁscal authority: the value of a dollar of debt—1/Pt—depends on expectations about
ﬁscal decisions in the future; expectations, in turn, are determined by the tax rule the ﬁscal
authority announces. The ﬁscal authority credibly commits to its tax rule and, given the
process for transfers, this determines the backing of government debt and, therefore, its
market value.10
As remarkable as it may seem, using the solution for the price level in (13) to compute
expected inﬂation, it is straightforward to show that βEt(Pt/Pt+1) = 1/R, as required by the
Fisher relation and monetary policy behavior.11 This observation leads to a sharp dichotomy
between the roles of monetary and ﬁscal policy in price-level determination: monetary policy
alone appears to determine expected inﬂation by choosing the level at which to peg the nom-
inal interest rate, R−1, while conditional on that choice, ﬁscal variables appear to determine
realized inﬂation.
To understand the nature of this equilibrium, we need to delve into the underlying eco-
nomic behavior. This is an environment in which changes in debt do not elicit any changes
in expected taxes, unlike in section 2.1.1. First consider a one-oﬀ increase in current transfer
payments, zt, ﬁnanced by new debt issuance, Bt. With no oﬀsetting increase in current or
10Cochrane (2001) refers to the intertemporal equilibrium condition, (IEC) or (24), as a “debt valuation
equation,” and reasons that government debt gets valued analogously to equities.













To ﬁnd expected inﬂation, simply use the date t − 1 version of (13) for Pt−1 and simplify to obtain
βEt(Pt/Pt+1) = 1/Rt−1 = 1/R.
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expected tax obligations, households feel wealthier and they try to shift up their consump-
tion paths. Higher demand for goods drives up the price level, and continues to do so until
the wealth eﬀect dissipates and households are content with their initial consumption plan.
This is why in expression (24) the value of debt at t changes with expected, but not current,
transfers. Now imagine that at time t households receive news of higher transfers in the
future. There is no change in nominal debt at t, but there is still an increase in household
wealth. Through the same mechanism, Pt must rise to revalue current debt to be consistent
with the new expected path of transfers.
Cochrane (2009, p. 5) oﬀers another interpretation of the equilibrium in which “‘aggre-
gate demand’ is really just the mirror image of demand for government debt.” Anexpectation
that transfers will rise in the future reduces the household’s assessment of the value of gov-
ernment debt. Households can shed debt only by converting it into demand for consumption
goods, hence the increase in aggregate demand that translates into a higher price level.
Expression (13) highlights that in this policy regime the impacts of monetary policy
change dramatically. When the central bank chooses a higher rate at which to peg the
nominal interest rate, the eﬀect is to raise the price level next period. This echos Sargent and
Wallace (1981), but the economic mechanism is diﬀerent. In the current policy mix, a higher
nominal interest rate raises the interest payments the household receives on the government
bonds it holds. Higher Rt−1Bt−1, with no higher anticipated taxes raises household wealth,
triggering the same adjustments as above. In this sense, as in Sargent and Wallace, monetary
policy has lost control of inﬂation.
This section has reviewed existing results on price-level determination under alternative
monetary-ﬁscal policy regimes. In each regime the price level is uniquely determined, but
the impacts of changes in policy diﬀer markedly across the two regimes. We now apply the
notion that there is a ﬁscal limit to create a natural setting that blends the two regimes just
considered.
2.2 Model 2 The second model adds a layer of subtlety to the analysis in sections 2.1.1
and 2.1.2. We take seriously the notion that there exists a limit to the degree of taxation
a society will tolerate by imposing that at some known date in the future, T, taxes have
reached this maximum allowable level, τmax.12 Leading up to T, policy is in the active
monetary/passive ﬁscal regime described above, but from date T on, tax policy has no option
but to become active, with τt = τmax for t ≥ T. If monetary policy remained active, neither
authority would stabilize debt and debt would explode. Existence of equilibrium requires
that monetary policy switch to being passive, which stabilizes debt.13 Table 1 summarizes
the assumptions about policy behavior.
To solve for this equilibrium we break the intertemporal equilibrium condition into two
12In this model with lump-sum taxes there is no upper bound for taxes or debt, so long as debt does not
grow faster than the real interest rate. But in a more plausible production economy, in which taxes distort
behavior, there would be a natural ﬁscal limit. See Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009) for further discussion
and Bi (2009) for an application of an endogenous ﬁscal limit to the issue of sovereign debt default.
13Monetary policy is forced to switch because we assume that the ﬁscal limit is an absorbing state. Davig
and Leeper (2009) display an equilibrium in which passive ﬁscal policy is a recurring state, so that it is
feasible for both policies to be active simultaneously, as least temporarily.
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Regime 1 Regime 2
t = 0,1,...,T − 1 t = T,T + 1,...
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where the function for the primary surplus, st, changes at the ﬁscal limit
st =
(
τ∗ − γ(Bt−1/Pt−1 − b∗) − zt, t = 0,1,...,T − 1
τmax − zt, t = T,...,∞
(15)
Expression (14) decomposes the value of government debt at the initial date into the expected
present value of surpluses leading up to the ﬁscal limit and the expected present value of
surpluses after the limit has been hit.




















The ﬁrst part of (14) is a bit messier, as it involves solving out for the endogenous taxes
that are responding to the state of government debt before the ﬁscal limit is hit. For any
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After substituting for the tax rule and the transfers process, the expected value of debt at
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This expression determinesthe equilibrium value of debt. The value of debt at t = 0—and
by extension at each date in the future—is uniquely determined by parameters describing
preferences and ﬁscal behavior and by the exogenous realization of transfers at that date.
We arrive at this expression by substituting out the endogenous sequence of taxes before
the ﬁscal limit. Apparently this economy will not exhibit Ricardian equivalence even if tax
policy obeys a rule that raises taxes to retire debt back to steady state. This occurs despite
the fact that in the absence of a ﬁscal limit such a tax rule delivers Ricardian equivalence,
as it did in section 2.1.1.
Two other implications are immediate. Higher transfers at time 0, z0, which portend a
higher future path of transfers because of their positive serial correlation, reduce the value
of debt. This occurs for the reasons that section 2.1.2 lays out: higher expected government
expenditures reduce the backing and, therefore, the value of government liabilities. A second
immediate implication is more surprising. How aggressively tax policy responds to debt
before hittingthe ﬁscal limit, as parameterizedby γ, mattersfor the value of debt. Permanent
active monetary/passive tax policies, in contrast, produce Ricardian equivalence in this
model, so the timing of taxation is irrelevant: how rapidly taxes stabilize debt has no bearing
on the value of debt. Both of these unusual implications are manifestations of the breakdown
in Ricardian equivalence that occurs when there is the prospect that at some point the
economy will hit a ﬁscal limit, beyond which taxes will no longer adjust to ﬁnance debt.14
I now turn to how the equilibrium price level is determined. Given B0/P0 from (18) and
calling the right side of (18) b0, use the government’s ﬂow budget constraint at t = 0 and
the fact that s0 = τ0 − z0, with taxes following the rule shown in table 1 to solve for P0:
P0 =
R−1B−1
b0 + τ0 − z0
(19)
Given R−1B−1 > 0, (19) yields a unique P0 > 0 if b0+τ0−z0 > 0, which it must if government
debt is valued. Entire sequences of equilibrium {Pt,R
−1
t }∞
t=0 are solved recursively: having
solved for B0/P0 and P0, obtain R0 from the monetary policy rule in table 1, and derive the
nomimal value of debt. Then use (18) redated at t = 1 to obtain equilibrium B1/P1 and the
government budget constraint at t = 1 to solve for P1 using (19) redated at t = 1, and so
forth.
The equilibrium price level has the same features as it does under the passive mone-
tary/active tax regime in section 2.1.2. Higher current or expected transfers, which are not
backed in present-value terms by expected taxes, raise household wealth, increase demand
14This is not to suggest that one cannot cook up “Ricardian scenarios.” For example, because T is known,
if the government were to commit to fully ﬁnance the change in the present value of transfers that arises
from a shock to z0 before the economy reaches the ﬁscal limit, one could obtain a Ricardian outcome. But
this is driven by the fact that T is known. If T were uncertain, as in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009), with
some probability of occurring at every date, even this cooked-up scenario would not produce a Ricardian
result.
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for goods, and drive up the price level (reducing the value of debt). A higher pegged nom-
inal interest rate raises nominal interest payments, raising wealth and the price level next
period. Similarities between this equilibrium and that in section 2.1.2 stem from the fact
that price-level determination is driven by beliefs about policy in the long run. From T on,
this economy is identical to the ﬁxed-regime passive monetary/active ﬁscal policies economy
and it is beliefs about long-run policies that determine the price level. Of course, before the
ﬁscal limit the two economies are quite diﬀerent and the behavior of the price level will also
be diﬀerent.
In this environment where the equilibrium price level is determined entirely by ﬁscal
considerations through its interest rate policy, monetary policy determines the expected




















where monetary policy behaves as table 1 speciﬁes.
As argued above, the equilibrium price level sequence, {Pt}∞
t=0 is determined by versions
of (18) and (19) for each date t, so (20) describes the evolution of expected inﬂation. Given
equilibrium P0 from (19) and an arbitrary P−1—arbitrary because the economy starts at
t = 0 and cannot possibly determine P−1, regardless of policy behavior—(20) shows that
E0(P0/P1) grows relative to the initial inﬂation rate. In fact, throughout the active monetary
policy/passive ﬁscal policy phase, for t = 0,1,...,T −1, expected inﬂation grows at the rate
αβ−1 > 1. In periods t ≥ T monetary policy pegs the nominal interest rate at R, and
expected inﬂation is constant: Et(Pt/Pt+1) = (Rβ)−1 = 1/π∗.
The implications of the equilibrium laid out in equations (18), (19), and (20) for gov-
ernment debt, inﬂation, and the anchoring of expectations on the target values (b∗,π∗) are
most clearly seen in a simulation of the equilibrium. Figure 1 contrasts the paths of the
debt-GDP ratio from two models: the ﬁxed passive monetary/active tax regime in section
2.1.2—dashed line—and the present model in which an active monetary/passive tax regime
is in place until the economy hits the ﬁscal limit at date T, when policies switch permanently
to a passive monetary/active tax combination—solid line.15
The ﬁxed regime displays stable ﬂuctuations of real debt around the 50 percent steady
state debt-GDP, which, of course, the other model also produces once it hits the ﬁscal limit.
Leading up to the ﬁscal limit, however, it is clear that the active monetary/passive tax policy
combination does not keep debt near target. Expected inﬂation evolves according to (20).
Evidently, since leading up the ﬁscal limit monetary policy is active, with α > 1/β, there is
no tendency for expected inﬂation to be anchored on the inﬂation target. Figure 2 plots the
inverse of inﬂation from the ﬁxed-regime model in section 2.1.2—dashed line—and from the
present model—solid line—along with expected (inverse) inﬂation from the present model—
dotted dashed line. Inﬂation in the ﬁxed regime ﬂuctuates around 1/π∗ and, of course, with
the pegged nominal interest rate, expected inﬂation is anchored on target. But in the period
leading up to the ﬁscal limit, the price level is being determined primarily by ﬂuctuations in
15Figures 1 through 4 use the following calibration. Leading up to the ﬁscal limit, α = 1.50 and γ = 0.20
and at the limit and in the ﬁxed-regime model, α = γ = 0.0. We assume steady state values τ∗ = 0.19,
z∗ = 0.17, π∗ = 1.02 (gross inﬂation rate) and we assume 1/β = 1.04 so that b∗ = 0.50. The transfers
process has ρ = 0.90 and σ = 0.003. Identical realizations of transfers were used in all the ﬁgures.
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Figure 1: Debt-GDP ratios for a particular realization of transfers for two models: the
ﬁxed passive monetary/active tax regime in section 2.1.2—dashed line—and the present
model in which an active monetary/passive tax regime is in place until the economy hits
the ﬁscal limit at date T, when policy switch permanently to a passive monetary/active tax
combination—solid line.
the real value of debt, which as ﬁgure 1 shows, deviates wildly from b∗. Expected inﬂation
in that period, though not independent of the inﬂation target, is certainly not anchored by
the target. Instead, under active monetary policy, the deviation of expected inﬂation from
target grows with the deviation of actual inﬂation from target in the previous period. The
ﬁgure shows how equation (20) makes expected inﬂation follow actual inﬂation, with active
monetary policy amplifying movements in expected inﬂation.
The result for periods t = 0,1,...,T − 1 is reminiscent of Loyo’s (1999) analysis of
Brazilian monetary-ﬁscal interactions in the 1980s. Throughout the 1970s Brazilian tax
policy was active and monetary policy was passive. Inﬂation, interest rates, and primary
deﬁcits were stable. In 1980, partly in response to pressure from international organizations,
Brazilian monetary policy switched to being active. Doubly active policies is essentially what
is going on in the model above because the knowledge that taxes will hit their limit at time T
prevents expected surpluses from that period on from adjusting to satisfy the intertemporal
equilibrium condition. In Brazil, when monetary policy switched to being active, with no
corresponding switch in ﬁscal policy to being passive, inﬂation and interest rates began to
grow rapidly, even though there was no change in seigniorage revenues. Loyo’s analysis
reverses the ordering of this model, with passive monetary/active ﬁscal policy before T, and
doubly active policies after.
To underscore the extent to which inﬂation is unhinged from monetary policy, even in the
active monetary/passive tax regime before the ﬁscal limit, ﬁgures 3 and 4 repeat the previous
ﬁgures, but make the response of the passive tax policy to debt weaker (γ is reduced to 0.1
from 0.2). As might be expected, when taxes respond more weakly to debt, the debt run-
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at T = 10
Figure 2: Inverse of inﬂation for a particular realization of transfers for two models: the
ﬁxed passive monetary/active tax regime in section 2.1.2—dashed line—and the present
model in which an active monetary/passive tax regime is in place until the economy hits
the ﬁscal limit at date T, when policy switch permanently to a passive monetary/active tax
combination—solid line; expectation of inverse inﬂation from present model—dotted dashed
line.
up that appears in ﬁgure 1 is ampliﬁed in the period leading ip to the ﬁscal limit. More
surprising, the change in the tax rule dramatically alters the inﬂation and expected inﬂation
processes, even in a regime, that were it expected to last forever, would exhibit Ricardian
equivalence.
Because monetary policy loses control of inﬂation after the ﬁscal limit it reached, forward-
looking behavior implies it also loses control of inﬂation before the ﬁscal limit is hit. By
extension, changes in ﬁscal behavior in the period leading up to the limit aﬀects both the
equilibrium inﬂation process and the process for expected inﬂation.
2.3 Model 3 The two models presented above contain no uncertainty about future policy
regime, making the rather implausible—though extremely common—assumption that agents
know exactly what monetary and ﬁscal policies will be in eﬀect at every date in the future.
Although this assumption is maintained in nearly all macro studies, it is diﬃcult to reconcile
the assumption with observed policy behavior. In fact, policies do change and, therefore,
they can change. In the face of a history of changes in policy regimes, analyses that fail
to incorporate the possibility of regime change into expectations formation run the risk of
misspecifying expectations and providing misleading policy advice.16 Given the prominent
role ascribed to expectations formation in policy discussions and deliberations, this is a
potentially serious misspeciﬁcation of policy models.
16This is the theme of Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1982, 1984), Sims (1982, 1987), Andolfatto and
Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), Davig (2004), Davig and Leeper (2006b,a, 2007, 2009), Chung,
Davig, and Leeper (2007), and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009).
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Figure 3: Repeats ﬁgure 1 and adds debt-GDP in the active monetary/passive tax regime
before the economy hits the ﬁscal limit at date T, when the response of taxes to debt is
weaker (γ = 0.1)—dotted dashed line.
























Figure 4: Repeats ﬁgure 2 and adds inverse of inﬂation—solid line with circles—and expec-
tation of inverse of inﬂation—dotted dashed line with circle—in the active monetary/passive
tax regime before the economy hits the ﬁscal limit at date T, when the response of taxes to
debt is weaker (γ = 0.1).
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I introduce uncertainty about policy in a stark fashion that allows me to extract some
implications of policy uncertainty while retaining analytical tractability. The economy con-
tinues to hit the ﬁscal limit at a known date T, at which point taxes become active, setting
τt = τmax for all t ≥ T. Uncertainty arises because at the limit agents place probability q on
a regime that combines passive monetary policy with active transfers policy and probability
1 − q on a regime with active monetary policy and passive transfers policy. In polite com-
pany, passive transfers policy is referred to as “entitlements reform.”17 To avoid the tangle
of euphemisms, I refer to this as “reneging on promised transfers.” Instead of receiving
promised transfers of zt at time t, agents receive λtzt, with λt ∈ [0,1], so λt is the fraction of
promised transfers that the government honors. Budget constraints for the household and
the government, equations (2) and (3), are modiﬁed to replace zt with λtzt.
Aging populations in many countriesrepresent a looming ﬁscal crisisthat oﬀers a practical
motivation for considering the possibility that governments may not honor their promises.
Some countries—Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden—are preparing for the
demographic shifts through the creation of superannuation funds or the adoption of ﬁscal
rules that aim to have surpluses that can be saved to meet future government obligations.
Other countries—Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States—are entering the period
of enhanced ﬁscal stress unprepared. In both sets of countries there is uncertainty about
exactly how the government will ﬁnance its obligations, but in the unprepared countries,
government reneging on promised transfers is a real possibility. This possibility potentially
has important impacts on expectations formation and economic decisions today.
For simplicity we reduce the previous models to just three periods. In the initial two
period (t = 0,1), the ﬁscal limithas not been reached, promisedtransfers follow the process in
(7), monetary policy is active and tax policy is passive. The economy begins with R−1B−1 >
0 given and some arbitrary P−1. This is equivalent to the time period t = 0,...,T − 1 in
section 2.2. At the beginning of period two (t = 2), the ﬁscal limit is reached but agents
remain uncertain about which mix of policies will be adopted. This uncertainty is resolved
at the end of period 2. In period 3, there is no uncertainty about policy and therefore, period
3 is completely analogous to section 2.2 for t = T,T + 1,....
Combining the Fisher relation, (4), with the active monetary policy rule, (5), for periods






































Agents know that in the next period (t = 2) the ﬁscal limit will be reached and policy
will switch to either a passive monetary/active transfers regime with probability q, or an
17To quote the New York Times, “Just about everybody agrees that solving the deﬁcit depends on reducing
the beneﬁts that current law has promised to retirees, via Medicare and Social Security. That’s not how
people usually put it, of course. They tend to use the more soothing phrase ‘entitlement reform.’ But
entitlement reform is just another way of saying that we can’t pay more in beneﬁts than we collect in taxes”
[Leonhardt (2009)].
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active monetary/passive transfers regime with probability (1−q). Assume that the reneging
rate is ﬁxed and known at t = 0, so λ2 = λ3 = λ ∈ [0,1]. Then the conditional probability




2 = R−1, z2 = ρz1 + ε2
(1 − q) R
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, λz2 = λρz1 + λε2





































In (24), to make the relationships transparent, I have imposed that τmax = τ∗, the steady
state level of taxes.
In period 3, τ3 is set to completely retire debt (B3 = 0) no matter which policy regime is
realized in period 2. This corresponds to τ3 = δz3 + (R2B2)/P3, where δ = 1 if the economy
is in the passive monetary/active transfers regime and δ = λ if the active monetary/passive
transfer regime is realized. This assumption implies that agents know one period in advance
which tax policy will be in place in the ﬁnal period.
Combining (21) and (23), we obtain a relationship between expected inﬂation between




















Given the discount rate β, this solution for expected inﬂation shows that whether expected
inﬂation converges to target or drifts from target depends on the probability of switching to
passive monetary/active transfers policies relative to how hawkishly monetary policy targets
inﬂation when it is active. For the deviation of expected inﬂation from target to be smaller
than the deviation of actual inﬂation from target in period t = 0, we need q > 1 − (β/α)3.
The longer the period leading up to the ﬁscal limit, the larger must q be to ensure that (25)
is stable. It may seem paradoxical, but the more hawkish is policy—larger α—the greater
must be the probability that monetary policy will be passive (“dovish?”) in the future in
order for the evolution of expected inﬂation to be stable. Resolution of this paradox comes
from recognizing that when q = 1, so monetary policy is known to be passive at the ﬁscal
limit, expected inﬂation is anchored on π∗, whereas when q = 0, so transfers policy is known
to be passive at the limit, then (25) yields equilibrium inﬂation, just as in section 2.1.1.
Since we assume that taxes in period 3 are known, and they are a function of exogenous
objects, we can treat τ3 as ﬁxed. Combining (22) and (24) and imposing that B3 = 0, as is













∗) − (ϑz3 − z
∗)
￿
− β(ϑz2 − z
∗) − (z1 − z
∗) (26)
where ϑ = q + (1 − q)λ determines expected post-reneging transfers.
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Equation (26) uniquely determines the value of debt in period 0 as a function of the
expected present value of surpluses. We can combine (26) with the government’s ﬂow con-
straint at t = 0 to obtain a unique expression for P0 as a function of R−1B−1, τ0, z0, and the
parameters in the expression for equilibrium B0/P0.
The solution in (26) leads to the following inferences. As q—the probability of switching
to the passive monetary/active transfers regime—rises, the value of debt at 0 falls, and
P0 rises. In addition, as λ—the fraction of transfers on which the government reneges in
periods 2 and 3—falls, the value of debt at 0 falls, and the price level rises. Both of the
consequences for P0 operate through standard ﬁscal theory wealth eﬀects. Higher q means
there is less likelihood that the government will renege, so expected transfers and, therefore,
household wealth rise. Households attempt to convert the higher wealth into consumption
goods, driving up the price level until real wealth falls suﬃciently that they are content
to consume their original consumption place. Lower λ also raises the expected value of
transfers, increasing wealth and the price level.
Expectational eﬀects associated with switching policies can be seen explicitly in (25)
and (26). Equation (26) shows that the value of debt is still determined by the discounted
expected value of net surpluses. In contrast to the previous models without uncertainty
about future policies, now the actual surplus is conditional on the realized policy regime.
Conditional on time t = 0 information, the expected transfers process in periods 2 and 3 is
unknown. If q ∈ (0,1) and at the end of period two passive monetary policy is realized, agents
will be “surprised” by amount z2(1 − q)(1 − λ) in period 2 and by amount z3(1 − q)(1 − λ)
in period 3. With transfers surprisingly high—because the passive transfers regime with
reneging was not realized—households feel wealthier and try to convert that wealth into
consumption. This drives up the price level in periods 2 and 3, revaluing debt downward.
This surprise acts as an innovation to the agent’s information set due to policy uncertainty.
Naturally, as agents put high probability on this regime occurring (q ≈ 1) or assumes the
amount of reneging is small (λ2,λ3 ≈ 1), the surprise is also small, and vice versa.
Comparing (25) with (20), expected inﬂation in period 1 now depends on q, which sum-
marizes beliefs about future policies. This is true even though the monetary policy regime
is active in period 1. The previous model demonstrated that monetary policy alone cannot
determine the price level. With policy uncertainty, monetary policy alone cannot determine
expected inﬂation. If agents put high probability on the passive monetary/active transfers
regime (q ≈ 1), then expected inﬂation at the beginning of period 2 will be primarily pinned
down by the nominal peg. This result is irrespective of the actual policy regime announced
at the end of period 2. It is in this sense that expectational eﬀects about policy uncertainty
can dramatically alter equilibrium outcomes.
In this simple setup, these expectational eﬀects are limited in magnitude because agents
know precisely when the ﬁscal limit is reached. The additional level of uncertainty not exam-
ined in these simple models, but present in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009), is randomness
in when tax policy will hit the the ﬁscal limit. In that environment, the conditional prob-
ability of switching policies outlined above would contain an additional term specifying the
conditional probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit in that period. This implies that, because
there is positive probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit in every period up to T, these expec-
tational eﬀects will be present from t = 0,...,T and will gradually become more important
as the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit increases. In eﬀect, the endogenous probability
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of hitting the ﬁscal limit makes the probability q time varying.
2.4 Summary The models presented above severely understate the degree of uncertainty
about future policies that private agents face in actual economies. To derive a rational
expectations equilibrium, I have taken stands on the stochastic structure of the economy
that are diﬃcult to reconcile with observations about any actual policy environment.18
Remarkably, the models show that even in a setting that drastically understates the actual
degree of uncertainty, private expectations of monetary and ﬁscal objectives are not well
anchored on the targets of policy. These models also make clear that in an economy that
faces heightened ﬁscal stress, the monetary policy behavior that most economists regard
as “good” cannot control either actual or expected inﬂation. “Good” monetary policy can
actually exaggerate the swings in expected inﬂation.
3 Policy Institutions and Future Policies
This section examines monetary and ﬁscal policy arrangements in Chile and the United
States to draw some inferences about how the theoretical points derived above might play
out in those economies. Chile and America oﬀer interesting contrasts. Whereas Chile has
adopted speciﬁc objectives and even rules for the conduct of monetary and ﬁscal policy,
America has eschewed rules-based policies. Banco Central de Chile is guided by an explicit
inﬂation target; the Federal Reserve operates under a multiple mandate. Chile has adopted
a series of ﬁscal rules, designed in part to provide for its aging population; the United States
has done nothing except implement short-run ﬁscal policies that are projected to double the
outstanding debt over the next decade. For the theme of this paper—how macro policies do
or do not anchor expectations—the contrast is particularly relevant.
3.1 The United States Evenin normal times, the multipleobjectivesthat guide Federal
Reserve decisions and the absence of any mandates to guide federal tax and spending policies
conspire to make it very diﬃcult for private agents to form expectations of monetary and
ﬁscal policies.19
In the United States, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) regularly publishes pro-
jections of the country’s long-run ﬁscal situation. In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis and
recession of 2007-2009, monetary and ﬁscal policies have not been normal and, as long-term
projections by the CBO make plain, in the absence of dramatic policy changes, policies are
unlikely to return to normalcy for generations to come. Figure 5 reports actual and CBO
projections of federal transfers due to Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare as a percent-
age of GDP [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009)]. Demographic shifts and rising relative
costs of health care combine to grow these transfers from under 10 percent of GDP today to
about 25 percent in 70 years. One much-discussed consequence of this growth is shown in
ﬁgure 6, which plots actual and CBO projections of federal government debt as a share of
GDP from 1790 to 2083. Relative to the future, the debt run-ups associated with the Civil
18Sargent (2006) acknowledges this and goes so far as to say that American monetary and ﬁscal policies are
marked by “ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty,” which preclude the speciﬁcity about stochastic structure
assumed in the models of section 2.
19This section draws heavily on Leeper (2009) and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2009).
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Other Federal Non-interest Spending
Medicare and Medicaid
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Figure 5: Projected and actual federal expenditures decomposed into Medicare, Medicaid,
and Social Security spending and other non-interest spending. The solid line represents
actual and projected revenues under the Extended-Baseline scenario, which assumes current
law does not change. Source: Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009).
War, World War I, World War II, the Reagan deﬁcits, and the current ﬁscal stimulus are
mere hiccups.
What can be learned from such debt projections? Two things. First, under the main-
tained assumptions, debt will grow exponentially in these countries. Second, the maintained
assumptions—which produced the exploding debt paths—cannot possibly hold. We learn
the second point from the intertemporal equilibrium condition. Figure 6 implies that within
our children’s lifetimes, U.S. debt will exceed the ﬁscal limit, violating the intertemporal
equilibrium condition.20 These projections are public information and well understood by
investors who continue to buy these government bonds without demanding a risk premium.
Why do they continue to buy bonds? Because their expectations of future policy adjustments
are at odds with the projections’ maintained assumptions. In sum, ﬁgures of exploding debt
paths, which ﬁscal authorities around the world routinely publish, arise from economic be-
havior that is not happening and which ﬂies in the face of basic economic logic. Projections
of things that cannot happen cannot help to anchor expectations.
Having the future inherit larger government debt is problematic for several reasons. First,
higher debt entails higher debt service and more government expenditures must be devoted
to paying interest on outstanding debt. Historically, countries have found that higher debt
service crowds out other forms of government expenditures. Second, as the intertemporal
equilibrium condition implies, higher debt requires higher present-value surpluses. But that
present value is bounded: as a share of GDP, tax revenues have some maximum level and
spending has some minimum level. At those levels, the natural ﬁscal limit is reached and
the economy cannot support a value of debt higher than that limit. By pushing more debt
20The U.S. ﬁscal limit is unknown, but I imagine it implies something less than a 300 percent debt-GDP
ratio.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: CBO’s projections of Debt-to-GDP ratio under Extended-Baseline and Alternative
Fiscal Financing Scenarios. Extended-Baseline assumes current law does not change, while
Alternative Fiscal Financing allows for “policy changes that are widely expected to occur
and that policymakers have regularly made in the past,” according to the CBO. Source:
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009).
into the future, current policies move debt closer to the ﬁscal limit, which places restrictions
on ﬁscal ﬂexibility in the future. But the future is when the ﬁscal consequences of aging
populations come home to roost; it is precisely when ﬁscal ﬂexibility is most needed.
Additional reasons that higher debt is problematic tie back to anchoring expectations.
Higher levels of interest payments require larger future ﬁscal adjustments. If the public is
uncertain about the hows and whys of those adjustments, the macroeconomic consequences
of the move to higher debt will be diﬃcult to predict. But there is another more fundamental
issue. In countries without guidelines governing debt levels, large debt run-ups leave unan-
swered a question that is critical to the public’s formation of expectations: will the economy
settle in at the new, higher level of debt or will policy endeavor to retire debt back to its
previous level or some other level? The answer to this question is central to the public’s
ability to form reasonable ﬁscal expectations.
And what of Federal Reserve policy? Many observers believe that U.S. monetary policy
performance improved dramatically with the appointment of Chairman Paul Volcker in 1979
and continued to be good at least until the most recent period [Taylor (1999a), Clarida,
Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999)]. The appointment of a sequence of good Federal Reserve chairs,
however, has been largely a matter of luck, rather than a reﬂection of institutional reform.
This institutional reality is underscored by the fact that the particular Fed chair plays such a
large role in the outcome of Fed policies. Expectations formation is all the more challenging
in this kind of unstructured environment.
3.2 Chile Two linchpinsin Chilean macro policies are the mandate that Banco Central de
Chile targets a three percent inﬂation rate (plus or minus a percentage point) and the Fiscal
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Responsibility Law.21 The Basic Constitutional Act of the Central Bank of Chile, passed in
1989, granted the central bank full independence and prescribed price stability and smooth
functioning of the payments systems as its objectives. A formal inﬂation target was adopted
in 2007, with the aim of hitting three percent inﬂation “in a medium term horizon of two
years.” As with many inﬂation targeting central banks, along with the explicit target came
enhanced transparency and an emphasis on communication with the public.
Although many countries adopted inﬂation targeting without also implementing a com-
patible ﬁscal framework, Chile has been at the vanguard of countries that have reformed
their monetary and ﬁscal policy institutions jointly. Chilean ﬁscal policy has been guided by
a structural surplus rule since 2000 and the rule was given some legal teeth by the passage of
the Fiscal Responsibility Law in August 2006. In the beginning, the ruled aimed for a struc-
tural surplus of 1 percent of GDP. But the target itself is state dependent: it was changed
to 0.5 percent in 2008 and since January 2009 it was changed again, explicitly temporarily,
to aim to balance the budget.
Like many Latin American countries, Chilean ﬁscal policy was strongly procyclical, which
exacerbated cyclical ﬂuctuations.22 The structural balance methodology, and the associated
surplus rule, were designed to counter the procyclicality, among several other key goals. To
arrive at the structural surplus, the government estimates what revenues it would receive if
the economy were growing at trend and the prices of copper and molybdenum were at their
long-run levels.23 For the ﬁrst six years the aim of the surplus was to accumulate assets
that could be used to meet future government obligations, particularly guaranteed minimum
pensions and old-age transfer payments.
Beneﬁts from the adoption of the structural surplus rule have been remarkable. Some
key beneﬁts include
1. Chilean ﬁscal policy has been freed to behave countercyclically.
2. Government debt and interest payments on debt fell through the 2000s, with gross
central debt down to 5 percent of GDP in 2008.
3. Establishment of a Pension Reserve Fund whose assets are invested, just as private
pension funds are invested, and accumulated to meet future obligations.24
4. Sovereign debt interest-rate spreads for Chile are now well below those of other emerg-
ing economies and did not rise after 9/11 or the Argentine crisis of 2002, when other
countries’ spread rose sharply; the decline in Chilean spreads began with the adoption
of the structural balance policy.
21This section draws on several sources, including Perry, Serv´ en, and Suesc´ un (2008), Singh, Belaisch,
Collyns, De Masi, Krieger, Meredith, and Rennhack (2005), Rodr´ ıguez C., Tokman R., and Vega C. (2007),
Marshall (2003), Banco Central de Chile (2007), Velasco (2008), and International Monetary Fund (2009).
22Procyclicality and its consequences are documented in Gavinand Perotti (1997) and Kaminsky, Reinhart,
and V´ egh (2004).
23Batini, Levine, and Pearlman (2009) and Kumhof and Laxton (2009) assess the performance of such a
rule in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
24Several countries have similar funds. Norway has created a large sovereign wealth fund from oil revenues;
Australia and New Zealand have superannuation funds.
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5. Declining sovereign debt risk spreads speak directly to the improved prospects for
sustainability of Chile’s ﬁscal policies.
Items 4 and 5 cut on the paper’s theme of anchoring expectations and, therefore, deserve
elaboration.25 Small open economies are susceptible to large external shocks that make the
economies highly volatile. This tendency is still more pronounced in economies, like Chile,
that are strongly aﬀected by ﬂuctuations in commodity prices. Bi (2009) shows theoretically
that default risk premia emerge from the market’s expectations about a country’s ability and
willingness to service its debt. Abilityarises endogenously from the country’s stochastic ﬁscal
limit, which is tied to the peak of the country’s Laﬀer curve. The probability distribution of
the ﬁscal limit depends on how persistent and volatile technology shocks are, the size of the
government, the degree of countercyclicality of ﬁscal policies, and the impatience of political
decisionmakers. Volatile economies tend to have highly dispersed distributions for the ﬁscal
limit, which increase the probability of default at any given debt-GDP ratio; countries with
large government transfer programs have ﬁscal limits with lower means; impatient political
leaders reduce the mean of the limit.
A country’s willingness to service debt is driven by the ﬂexibility of its ﬁscal policy.
Flexible policy implies a willingness to raise taxes or lower government expenditures in the
face of debt run-ups. A country that is operating well below its ﬁscal limit and is willing to
adjust surpluses to stabilize debt, can successfully steer its way through economic downturns
without incurring the wrath of ﬁnancial markets in the form of risk premia.
Viewed in the context of ﬁscal limits, Chile’s structural balance rule and related inno-
vations stemming from Fiscal Responsibility Law serve to move Chile’s government debt
position farther from the ﬁscal limit. Greater distance from the limit arises from both re-
duced government debt today and from eﬀectively shifting the distribution of the limit up
to higher debt-GDP levels. Shifts in the distribution of the ﬁscal limit come from forcing
a longer-term perspective on ﬁscal decisions and by creating reserves that can be tapped in
the future to ﬁnance beneﬁts to the aging population. In this sense, the structural balance
rule contributes in important ways to anchoring expectations on sustainable policies that
are well cushioned away from Chile’s ﬁscal limit.
As the theory in this paper implies, so long as the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit
in Chile is remote, there is every reason to believe that Banco Central de Chile’s eﬀorts at
inﬂation targeting will continue to be successful.
4 Concluding Remarks
Many countries are entering an extended period of relentless growth in transfer payments
promised to their aging populations. Some, but not all, of these countries ultimately are
relying on a pay-as-you-go scheme for ﬁnancing these expenditures. If there is a level of
taxation that, for economic or political reasons, those economies cannot exceed, then the
pay-as-you-go scheme is unsustainable.
As Herb Stein famously said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Stein
also pointed out that, although economists are good at pointing out when something cannot
25This discussion is based on the insightful study of ﬁscal limits and sovereign debt risk premia by Bi
(2009).
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persist indeﬁnitely, they are less adept at predicting when it will stop. True enough in the
present context. But we can say something constructive. Economic agents’ beliefs about
when the economy will reach its ﬁscal limit and how policies will adjust after the limit will
feedback to aﬀect the equilibrium we observe today, before the limit is reached. Predicting
when an economy will hit its ﬁscal limit is less important for policymaking than is the
systematic analysis of the possible existence of such a limit and all that that implies about
expectations and macro policy eﬀects.
For policymakers, the feedback from beliefs about the limit to the current equilibrium
should be disturbing. Because pre-limit economic decisions depend in part of beliefs about
post-limit policy behavior, accurate predictions of the impacts of policy changes today rely
on understanding to what those beliefs are anchored. Coherent monetary-ﬁscal frameworks
can help to anchor those beliefs. Incoherent frameworks can actually make beliefs even more
untethered.
Countries can guard against this eventualityby implementingmonetary-ﬁscal frameworks
that keep their debt-GDP ratios well away from their ﬁscal limits.26 But ﬁscal limits are
country speciﬁc and depend on myriad things that characterize a country’s political-economic
environment. No one-size-ﬁts-all policy framework will work across a highly diverse set of
countries.
Chile has instituted a monetary-ﬁscal framework that, at least for now, appears to be
moving the country farther from its ﬁscal limit. With suﬃcient distance from that limit,
there is reason to believe that Banco Central de Chile’s pursuit of inﬂation targeting can
successfully anchor actual and expected inﬂation. Progress has been far slower—or non-
existent—in many larger countries. And even responsible countries may bear some of the
costs created by those large countries.
26Of course, there is a delicate balancing act here, since high tax rates and low government infrastructure
spending, which could keep debt low, are also socially costly.
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